Bruce Jentleson: Use of War as a Tool of Politics
The director of the Sanford Institute discusses the difficulties facing the rebuilders of a post-war Iraq
Monday, March 24, 2003
Bruce W. Jentleson, director of Duke University's Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy, advised the Clinton administration during the Middle East peace process.
The objectives of deposing Saddam Hussein and disarming Iraq are likely to be achieved, although potentially at significant costs, both in the fighting within Iraq and terrorism in the United States and elsewhere. But even if the "shock and awe" strategy is relatively quick and easy, this is not sufficient for a full and lasting victory. Five critical issues arise from the politics that Bush has chosen as his other means:
* A STABLE DEMOCRATIC IRAQ: Regime change has been posed as not just the removal of Saddam, his sons and band of thugs but also the forging of a new Iraq that is democratic, stable and secure. The task is formidable. Comparisons to the successful U.S. military occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II are shockingly glib. Then, we acted with full international legitimacy, near total consent of the Germans and Japanese, and in a security environment that could be kept nonthreatening. None of those conditions holds in Iraq. And while there was not a single political killing of U.S. authorities in the 10 years of the German occupation or the seven years in Japan, it is highly doubtful we can go even a few months into an Iraqi occupation without terrorist reprisals.
We already have seen tensions both between the Bush
administration and the exiled Iraqi factions with which it has been
working, and among the factions themselves. One issue is how much
power the Iraqi MacArthur will have and for how long. Another is
who among the factions gets what political power and oil and other
economic spoils.
And there are lots of factions: ethnic and religious groups such
as the Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis with rivalries of their own,
including intra-Kurdish splits that often have torn asunder their
anti-Saddam alliance; the Iraqi National Congress as the
U.S.-favored exile group but with its own internal fissures; and
rival exile groups. I do not see Iraq splitting into separate
states like Yugoslavia in the 1990s, but I do see divisions and
inherent tensions that make national unity problematic and anything
resembling democracy even more difficult.
* MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRATIZATION AND PEACE: Under the Bush "big
bang" theory, the success of Iraqi democratization will send
positive shock waves through the region, leading to democratization
of other Arab states and getting the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process back on track. This is a bold vision but not rooted in
historical experience in the Middle East or the lessons of
democratization elsewhere. Moreover, there is real risk of feeding
into fundamentalism and anti-Americanism among Arab populaces. For
the tens of billions this war will cost, many more democratically
productive strategies come to mind. As to the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process, what is needed is a concerted effort to push the
Palestinian leadership to do more to end the violence and to
pressure the Sharon government to genuinely seek peace and
security.
* WAR ON TERRORISM: In global security meetings last month in
Germany as part of a U.S. congressional delegation, I was told by
high-ranking NATO officials and diplomats that aside from the
dispute over Iraq, we were getting A+ cooperation from the Germans
in the war on terrorism, including intelligence sharing, law
enforcement, breaking up financial networks and providing security
to German-based U.S. soldiers and their families. Germany leads
peackeepers in Afghanistan, and its navy patrols against al-Qaeda
in the Indian Ocean. These and other forms of cooperation are key
to enhancing our security against terrorists. If the dispute over
Iraq impedes cooperation with Germany and other allies, we risk
leaving ourselves worse off in the overall war on terrorism.
* U.S. STANDING IN THE WORLD: Hundreds of thousands of people in
Europe, parts of the Arab world and in Asia took to the streets to
express their empathy for Americans after the Sept. 11, 2001,
attacks. A recent poll shows how much our image has plummeted: from
78 percent favorable in Germany in 2000 to 25 percent today; in
France, from 62 percent to 31 percent; in Turkey, from 52 percent
to 12 percent; in Russia, from 37 percent to 28 percent; in Britain
from 83 percent to 48 percent. This affects the influence we can
exert over others not only on Iraq and the war on terrorism but on
many issues with impacts on our own interests.
* THE UNITED NATIONS: The United Nations can be a frustrating
institution, but it is essential. Under Secretary-General Kofi
Annan, it had been playing a more effective role. The French and
others made it difficult for multilateralism to work and grossly
downplayed the serious security threat that Saddam has posed for
more than a decade. But the Bush administration did little more
than go through the motions of diplomacy. The possible win-win
strategy of imposing a tough inspections regime and disarmament
strategy, combining U.S. power with U.N. legitimacy, was sacrificed
to national rivalries. Now the United Nations is left with its
credibility damaged, immersed in recriminations. In an age in which
so few threats can be met by any one nation alone, the world needs
an effective U.N.
The U.S. military has extraordinary power. Our forces are
showing their courage, capability and patriotism. But this war
cannot be won on the battlefield alone. For this is a classic case
of war as politics by other means.
